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Introduction 
As a critical realist who has spent many years trying to practice a social science that is 
critical of the social world, I have frequently consulted the literature of critical theory as 
a source of clarification of the nature and purpose of this kind of research and 
knowledge. But while I felt it had some important lessons, it also seemed peculiar and 
strangely limited. At the same time, substantive critical social science has become 
increasingly timid and cautious in the last thirty years, compared to that of the 1960s 
and 1970s, and not nearly as critical of the social world as the writings of the founding 
figures of social science in the 18th and 19th centuries (Sayer, 2011).  
In anglophone social science and philosophy, it is Habermas who has been the most 
influential critical theorist during this period. There are several things I find strange 
about his work and that of others like him: 
- the extent to which it is concerned with defining and defending the nature, 
legitimation and purpose of social theory through continual reinterpretations of 
its founders’ writing; as such critical theory seems inward looking and more 
deliberated upon than applied and used for critiques of society; 
- its avoidance of ontology, and with that, naturalism, so the discussions of critique 
say little or nothing about well-being, flourishing and suffering; 
- its tendency to prioritise procedural, and formal criteria for critique and avoid 
substantive content in terms of what is good or bad, both for reasons to do with 
Kantian influences, and avoiding partiality, ethnocentrism, and restriction of 
human possibilities; 
- the avoidance of ontology is paralleled by a concentration on the ‘horizontal’ intra 
and inter-discursive relations of reason, while ‘vertical’ relations between 
discourse and its referents are de-emphasized; 
- its overwhelmingly abstract focus and its avoidance of empirical references 




Critical realism (CR), by comparison, is very much about ontology (Bhaskar, 1975, 1998; 
Collier, 1994). Where epistemology is concerned, it is permissive and fallibilist, 
emphasizing that while our understanding of the world is always mediated and fallible, 
it is fallible because the world is not the product of our thought: to be capable of being 
mistaken about the world, there must be something independent of our thought it can 
be mistaken about. At base realism is characterised by its insistence on taking this 
independence seriously, without falling into the defeatist trap of assuming it means we 
cannot expect to find any reliable knowledge of the world. In addition to construing the 
world in various ways, we can also socially construct things, but then, as with any 
process of construction, to be successful, we have to do this in ways that take account of 
the properties of the materials – physical and ideational – that we use. Wishful thinking 
rarely works. Our degree of success gives us feedback on the adequacy our 
understanding and practice. 
CR has a naturalist element in the sense that, in line with its ontology, it implies that we 
need to pay attention to the kind of beings we are, so that where ethical reason is 
concerned, attentiveness to the capacities and vulnerabilities of humans and other 
sentient beings is fundamental. Instead of elevating reason, understood as detached 
rationality of thought, as the only safe source of critique, it includes other forms of 
making sense of and experiencing the world, including the natural and social sciences, 
and everyday emotions and practice. 
While I write as a critical realist, I have also been influenced by three other major kinds 
of thinking, which complement it: neo-Aristotelianism, particularly the work of Martha 
Nussbaum, but also Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Joseph Dunne; the feminist 
literature on the ethic of care; and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(Nussbaum, 2001, MacIntyre, 1999, Dunne, 2009, Taylor, 1993, Kittay, 1999, Tronto, 
1994; Smith, 1759). Consequently, I’m not proposing to present a ‘purely’ CR view of 
critical social science. I shall draw upon some ideas from my book Why Things Matter to 
People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life, and try to take them a little further, noting 
some key differences from the critical theory tradition (Sayer, 2011). I shall present a 
brief summary of the main elements of what I see as a viable and justifiable critical social 
science. I then move from a discussion of relevant aspects of CR and naturalism to 
discussions of values, the character of critical social science, and a brief summary of my 
misgivings about discourse ethics, ending with a review of various critical standpoints 
for social science. First, though, it’s necessary to clear some ground. 
 
The scholastic fallacy and its siblings 
[Critique has] “retreated into the ‘small  world’ of academe, where it enchants 
itself with itself without ever being in a position to really threaten anyone about 
anything.” (Bourdieu, P. 2003, Firing Back, p. 2) 
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‘Scholastic Fallacy’ is a term used by Pierre Bourdieu to refer to a tendency of academics 
to project unknowingly the particular characteristics of their contemplative and 
discursive relation to the world onto everything they study (Bourdieu, 2000). The fallacy 
could also be seen as a target of some of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach. It’s especially 
common in philosophy, the most contemplative and discursively focused of the 
disciplines, and hence in critical theory too. The unreflexive projection of a life of reason 
and contemplation onto social actors means that they are seen mainly as reasoners, not 
as doers - sentient in ways that go beyond the capacity for reason. As Bourdieu argues, 
much of what people do is ‘on automatic’, on the basis of dispositions and skills acquired 
through previous social practices and of which we are only partly aware. Further, just as 
‘distance from necessity’ (e.g. having time for abstract and non-functional activities) 
affirms symbolic dominance, so does disdain for the concrete and empirical in some 
academic literature. 
While this fallacy is very evident, particularly in the more philosophically oriented social 
theory, there are several other complementary tendencies.  
First is a tendency to see causes always as enemies, the body and emotions as 
heteronomy, and reason as affording autonomy against these through (apparently) 
escaping causation and yet somehow capable of controlling our actions. The dichotomy 
of reason and causation provides no way of understanding how we intervene in the 
world, or of how we influence and are influenced by it, both pushing and being pushed, 
both as causal agents and as subject to causal processes. At a philosophical level this is 
underpinned by a tendency to see discourse as a-causal, indeed as radically different to 
the realm of causes. For critical realists, causes are simply whatever produces or blocks 
change, so while discourses and meaningful action, unlike purely physical processes, 
certainly have to be understood through verstehen to identify their constitutive 
meanings, they can also be causes of behaviour. If we didn’t think reasons and other 
discursive elements could make (i.e. cause) people (to) think,1 feel and act in certain 
ways, what would be the point of discourse? 
Second, the human mind is reduced to its capacity for reasoned reflection, while its 
interaction with the body, and its capacity for emotion are seen as incidental or worse, a 
threat to reason. Aside from any intellectual justifications for this, the aversion to the 
body and emotion has a sociological explanation in the social (class) distance between 
academics and those whose work and relation to the world is primarily practical. 
                                                          
1 A possible reason for the rejection of the idea of reasons and other discursive elements as causal stems 
from the failure to critique the dominant positivist conception of causation as being about fixed 
regularities. Discourse and its effects seem to lack regularity. CR shows this conception to be incoherent 
and argues for a concept of causal powers, contingently activated, whose effects when activated depend 
on context, so that causation has no necessary link to empirical regularities. So unique causes – material or 
discursive – can be efficacious (Bhaskar, 1998; Harré and Madden, 1975). 
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Keeping an academic cool and maintaining a professional gravitas – strategies of 
distinction in Bourdieu’s terms - easily lead to an avoidance of vulnerability, emotion, 
love, infancy and helplessness, so that much social theory and philosophy has a 
somewhat autistic, lofty and masculinist character. It fits with a left-brain view of the 
world – logical and focused but lacking much of the awareness of context, or empathy 
and concern associated with the right brain. As neuroscience has shown, the former 
depends on the latter, and without it we cannot make good judgements or function 
successfully in interaction with others (Damasio, 1994). To argue this is not to reject 
reason for romanticism, for we need reason and science to deepen our understanding of 
it. 
Third, the valuation of the adult, implicitly male, independent reasoner can easily lead to 
a view of human life that ignores our inescapable dependence on others, our need for 
care and emotional intelligence, and the way in which our capacities as adults, including 
our capacity for independent reasoning and for understanding others, depend on our 
upbringing. The more psychoanalytic currents in critical theory may address some of 
this, though again often more in dialogue with ancestors of critical theory (Freud) than 
through attending to the findings of more recent empirical research. Our social nature 
derives from our dependence on others for care in early life before it derives from 
communicative interaction. Both are important, and it is dangerous to dismiss the 
former as of only passing significance. The pathologies of contemporary masculinity in 
many societies have much to do with the suppression and denial of this vulnerability 
and dependence and of right brain awareness, and there is a great irony in a critical 
theory that prides itself on its reflexivity but embodies this one-sidedness. 
The net effect of the scholastic fallacy and these associated tendencies is to lead us to 
disregard naturalistic criteria for developing critical standpoints, from which societies, 
practices and discourses can be evaluated. All these tendencies have to be countered if 
we are to develop adequate critical social science. One of many reasons why Axel 
Honneth’s work on recognition is a welcome development in critical theory is that it 
takes us closer to naturalism and eudaimonistic criteria (i.e. concerning well-being) for 
critical theory. For example, it acknowledges the importance to individuals of 
unconditional love in their childhood (Honneth, 1995; 2007). It is therefore much more 
usable in critical social science than discourse ethics. 
 
Critical realism and naturalism 
As I noted, critical realist philosophy is primarily about ontology. Thus causation 
depends not on the logical relation between statements or regularities, as in logical 
empiricism, but on the qualities of things and their relationships. When applied in social 
science, it therefore asks the following kinds of ‘retroductive’ questions (Sayer, 2000):  
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• What is it about x that enables it to do y? 
• What is it about people and society that makes them cultural beings and 
ethical/unethical beings? 
• What is it about people that makes recognition – or anything - matter to them? 
To answer the last two questions we would have to consider what our nature as human 
beings is. This is a question that many regard with alarm. We are cultural, historical 
beings, they will say, and to describe us as having a nature is to risk fixing us, 
universalising the historically- and culturally-specific features of our own culture and 
treating them as a norm. These are indeed risks, but to say that we are cultural beings is 
already to say something about our nature, and begs a realist question: what is it about 
human beings (and certain other species) that enables them to develop cultures?; not 
just any object or species is capable of being acculturated. The dangers of ignoring our 
nature (in the sense of constitution and capacities, not merely biology) are just as great. 
Often the fears are increased by a mistaken assumption that nature is immutable: but it 
can be changed, albeit in accordance with its properties. Sometimes attempts to describe 
human nature are referred to as ‘philosophical anthropology’, and in some circles this 
has become a pejorative term. But what I am proposing is not that2 but an empirical 
understanding, to be revised as relevant research proceeds. There are risks if we get this 
seriously wrong, but greater risks if we pretend we can do without it, for then we can 
voluntaristically ‘socially construct’ abuse and violence as good. 
Marx, in realist fashion, insisted on addressing these questions, particularly with regard 
to sentience. In the Theses on Feuerbach, he proposes that we should see ‘sensuousness’ 
not as mere capacity for reason but “as practical, human-sensuous activity”, as both 
making sense and being causally efficacious. In the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts he also offers a basic explanation of why things matter to us: “Man as an 
objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being - and because he feels that he 
suffers, a passionate being.” This much is well known to Marx scholars and no doubt to 
critical theorists. But there is also a less well known but striking comment in a letter to 
Lasalle. Following the death of Marx’s 8 year old son, Edgar, he wrote:  
“Bacon says that really important people have so many relations to nature and 
the world, so many objects of interest, that they easily get over any loss. I am not 
one of those important people. The death of my child has shattered me to the 
                                                          
2 While I did accept the term in my 2011 book, I’ve stopped using it not only because for some it’s a 
simple, unexplained – and unexamined? - pejorative, but because claims about our nature are no less 
based on empirical research, or more ‘philosophical’ than any other empirical claims. Further, I don’t see 




very core and I feel the loss as keenly as on the first day. My poor wife is also 
completely broken down.” Letter to Lasalle, 28/7/1855 
This suggests another aspect of our nature as social beings from those highlighted in 
Marx’s public remarks. We are not just beings who are social in that we live together and 
form divisions of labour, and so on. It is also because we are social in the sense of 
relational beings, who depend from the start on others with whom we can form 
attachments, both for our survival and our sense of who we are and our basic 
ontological security. Our attachments are not wholly reducible to communicative 
interaction with ‘interlocuters’, as the scholastic fallacy tends to imply. And our need of 
attachments is one of the reasons for our vulnerability, and vice versa. We could also 
add, following Margaret Archer, that we are beings who tend, contingently, to develop 
commitments and concerns, whether their objects be work, justice, politics, religion, art, 
music, sport, science, philosophy, or anything from archaeology and bees to yoga and 
zoology (Archer, 2000). These may assume considerable significance in our lives, such 
that the well-being of such practices and having access to them becomes crucial to our 
own sense of self and well-being. These are not ‘a priori’ claims but empirical findings 
that anyone can challenge. 
Being both vulnerable and capable, always poised between how things are now and how 
they could be in future, we are, and have to be, evaluative beings (Archer, 2000). 
Normativity would have no point otherwise. And as social beings, our evaluations of 
others and their behaviour are particularly important. This capacity for evaluation is not 
only evident in conscious consideration of ourselves in relation to our circumstances, 
but in our ongoing semi-conscious, non-discursive practical action through our 
emotional, affective, physical responses, which depend very much on dispositions 
acquired through previous practice (Murdoch, 1970). 
All these things - our capacity for practical, human-sensuousness, our capacity for 
suffering (and, by implication, flourishing), our dependence on and need of others as 
deeply social beings, and our emotions - are objective features, though of course the way 
they develop is culturally specific. We have differently cultivated natures. 
To be cultural beings we have to have the requisite neurological capacity and social 
upbringing. The fact that we care about anything presupposes our neediness, our lack 
and desire, and our capacity for both flourishing and suffering. Well-being or flourishing 
are objective3 states of being which we strive (fallibly) to discover and create. Our 
intentions only work out if they happen to be compatible with those capacities. The fact 
that such states are generally socially constructed does not alter this. Parental love is 
                                                          
3. I am using ‘objective’ here in the ontological sense of things that can exist independently of our knowing 




more conducive to childrens’ well being than neglect and abuse because of the 
vulnerable nature of children, regardless of whether this is recognized discursively or 
not. Nor does the fact that different cultures may offer different forms of well-being 
make them any less objective or mean that just any form of life can count as flourishing, 
as if our natures were wholly malleable and unconstrained. 
Flourishing is not just the absence of suffering: as Aristotle emphasized, it goes beyond 
this to the exercise and development of capacities. What we are allowed/required to do 
with our lives is central to it: it is not just a matter of distribution of resources, or indeed 
recognition, important though these are, but contribution, or more generally 
‘capabilities’, such as the ability to participate in the life of the community, to avoid 
violence and threat, to be able to exercise our bodies, imagination and senses, to 
participate in political decisions that influence our lives, and so on (Sen, 1999; 
Nussbaum, 2000). Nussbaum says her list of capabilities is presented as provisional and 
as the result of inter-cultural discussions on well-being. She describes it as ‘thick and 
vague’: thick in the sense that it acknowledges there are many elements of human 
flourishing; deliberately vague to allow for different cultural forms that they can take.  
Sen and Nussbaum are well-aware of the phenomenon of ‘adaptive preferences’, where 
people, particularly in disadvantaged positions, accept those positions rather than resist 
them: as Bourdieu often said, ‘they refuse what they are refused’. But consistent with 
their Aristotelian influences, they do not reduce well-being to a purely subjective matter 
of ‘happiness’. Those who have been denied the opportunity to participate in the 
governance of their community may not initially appreciate the opportunity when 
offered it, when everything in their upbringing has told them they don’t count and are 
not worthy. Which preferences are adaptive and which consistent with flourishing must 
be decided through open and democratic discussion that is open to empirical evidence 
and experimentation. Rather than bury our head in the sand and say it’s all subjective, or 
that empirical evidence is unreliable, and refuse to engage with any proposals regarding 
human flourishing, we need to face the challenge presented by capability claims; for 
example, do we or do we not think that being able to exercise our bodies, imagination 
and senses is important for well-being?  
To describe either suffering or flourishing is to make claims that are simultaneously and 
inseparably factual and evaluative. Thus a social worker who says ‘this child is being 
abused’ is making a statement that defies any fact-value distinction. In ‘thick ethical 
concepts’ such as abuse, humiliation, neglect or racism, the descriptive and the 
evaluative cannot be separated. If you don’t know that suffering or humiliation etc are 
bad, you don’t know what they are. We can’t get far in describing social phenomena 
without reference to flourishing and suffering. When we ask people how they are, we 
expect them to give some indication of how well or badly things are going for them. If 
your doctor told you your blood pressure was 190/100 but refused to tell you whether 
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that was good or bad on the grounds that that would be a value judgement and ‘not 
objective’, you would seek another doctor.  
I realise that many critical theorists also reject a sharp fact-value distinction, but 
consistent with realism and naturalism, my reasons for rejecting it are primarily 
ontological. The belief that we can understand the living world without value-
judgements is wrong not because value-judgements are an affliction that we 
unfortunately cannot escape, but because they’re necessary for describing states of 
being – and of course, for living. Good and bad health are states of being that can only be 
understood inter-subjectively but are not merely voluntaristically ‘constructed’. 
‘Objectivity’ in the epistemological sense of truth value has no necessary negative – or 
positive - relationship with values (Anderson, 2004). Defining objectivity in terms of 
value-freedom is a mistake. Facts and values are not necessarily separable and opposed. 
To be sure, evaluations are fallible, but so too are factual claims; they are not radically 
different. The desire for absolute guarantees of truth is misguided, and its inevitable 
disappointment easily leads to an impractical scepticism or relativism.  
No doubt it will be objected that a criterion of well-being for critical social science is 
problematic because we cannot give a full account of well-being for all people and 
cultures at all times or places. That’s true of course, but we should beware of the all-or-
nothing fallacy here: just because we can’t say everything about well-being it doesn’t 
follow that we know nothing reliable about it.4 There are some fundamental elements, 
some of them enshrined in rights, which we do know about, and have little excuse for 
ignoring. How can critical social scientists use terms like ‘racist’ without implying 
something about human capacities for flourishing and suffering? 
 
Values, virtues 
Coupled with this naturalist basis for critical evaluation is a distinctive view of the 
nature of values. The familiar dichotomising of values and facts is the result of a 200 
year process in which many philosophers and social scientists have attempted to expel 
values from social science. What is less often noticed is the other side of the coin in this 
process: the de-rationalisation of values. To correct this problematic divorce, we need to 
                                                          
4. Kant was too pessimistic about this: “It is not even known at all to us what the human being now is, 
although consciousness and the senses ought to instruct us in this; how much less will we be able to guess 
what one day he ought to become. Nevertheless, the human soul’s desire for knowledge snaps very 
desirously at this object, which lies so far from it, and strives, in such obscure knowledge, to shed some 





re-connect values to evaluations. Values are abstractions from particular evaluations 
that become sedimented as value-orientations or attitudes, which then recursively 
influence evaluations of particular things. However, the circle need not be closed, for 
evaluations are of things that can exist independently of their evaluation - for example, 
someone else’s behaviour. Particularly where ethical issues are concerned they are not 
merely conventional but eudaimonistic. That is, values have a direct or indirect 
relationship to understandings of well being or ill-being as objective states. Of course, 
the valuations are subject to challenge, but again, so too are factual claims; there is 




Despite the tendency of values to shape particular concrete evaluations, it is possible for 
people to notice when observed practices or situations don’t fit with their usual 
valuations. (We draw upon not one but many values in making any particular 
judgement, so it is possible for them to come into conflict.) Thus, a racist, confronted 
with unexpectedly virtuous behaviour from a member of the despised group, may be 
prompted to question her prejudices. 
10 
 
As Andrew Collier, a critical realist philosopher, argued, ethical behaviour depends on 
attentiveness to the situation at hand. This is evident in virtue terms like “‘considerate’ 
or ‘inconsiderate’, ‘thoughtful’ or ‘thoughtless’, ‘sensitive’ or ‘insensitive’” (Collier, 1999, 
p.16). When we wonder what to do or how we should judge something, the most 
important thing to do is find out as much as possible about it and reason about it 
(Collier, 1999; 2004). In English we often talk of (un)ethical behaviour or individuals as 
‘(un)reasonable’, not only in the sense that they will (not) listen to reason, but that they 
pay close attention to the well-being of those they engage with, and are sensitive to 
others’ needs and vulnerabilities; it is an ethical judgement of their character. It implies 
a capacity for empathy as Adam Smith emphasized (Smith, 1759).5 We cannot have 
justice unless we ‘do justice’ to people by attending to their capacities and 
vulnerabilities, as they are.6 Anyone who merely followed norms regardless and without 
any attentiveness to such specificities would be considered ‘unreasonable’, and of course 
this can lead to highly unethical behaviour, as the infamous example of Adolf Eichmann 
showed. As Jarrett Zigon puts it: 
 “morality is better thought of as a continuous dialogical process during which 
persons are in constant interaction with their world and the persons in that 
world, rather than as a set category of beliefs from which one picks appropriate 
responses to particular situations.” (Zigon, 2009, p. 155). 
In sociological terms, virtues and vices are dispositions - acquired embodied tendencies 
to behave in certain ways, and hence part of the habitus, though curiously Bourdieu 
himself made little of their ethical dimension. They have an emotional dimension, but 
again, emotions are not to be counterposed to reason as its opposite; as Martha 
Nussbaum argues, they have a cognitive aspect and are often intelligent embodied 
responses to our concerns, bodily, social and cultural (Nussbaum, 2001; 2014; see also 
Archer, 2000). Without them life would be difficult, indeed, as the condition of autism 
reveals, limited capacities for empathetic, emotional understanding make participation 
in social life difficult. This is also similar to Adam Smith’s view of moral sentiments as 
fallible but often intelligent responses to events.  
The most congenial major school of moral philosophy for social science is not 
deontology, utilitarianism or discourse ethics but virtue ethics, because of its emphasis 
on the formation of subjects through socialisation. Instead of individuals seemingly born 
as independent adults, already possessed of an autonomous capacity for reason 
independent of socialization and social context, what we are and much of how we think 
and act depends on what we have become through our practical engagement in social 
life from birth, as neuroscience, developmental and social psychology and sociology all 
tell us in different ways. One might see the ethic of care literature as complementary to 
                                                          
5. ‘Sympathy’ was Smith’s preferred term, though for him this meant an ability to read others’ minds, 
feelings and situation rather than compassion, which might or might not follow from its exercise. 
6 Nussbaum makes convergent points about justice and empathy (Nussbaum, 2006; 2014). I would also 
argue that equality of condition is important for well-being too (Sayer, 2011, 2014). 
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this through its enrichment of our understanding of how human beings contingently 
become ethical subjects. All of these literatures help explain the open-ended process of 
human becoming, and what it is about us that enables us to develop in such 
extraordinarily diverse cultural ways. Philosophy and the more philosophically oriented 
social theory, such as critical theory, need to take notice of this. 
Whereas critical theory emphasizes ‘horizontal’ relations within discourse, between 
speakers, and (ideally) their search for resolutions of problems in a situation where the 
only force is the force of the better argument, CR also emphasizes the ‘vertical’ relation 
of subject to object. The ‘reasonable’ person attends to the other not only as an 
interlocutor, but as a person with particular capacities, vulnerabilities and biography, 
while taking account of the concrete context. The view of values as (vertically) related to 
the objects (persons or practices) being valued, as well as (horizontally) to others in the 
value community fits with this. It implies reducing the importance typically attached to 
social norms in social science.7 At worst, a view of ethics and morality as based on norms 
as mere conventions effectively de-normativizes them, for the values and valuations 
then become just a matter of ‘what we do round here’ rather than also having a 
eudaimonistic content. “Conventionality is not morality . . .To attack the first is not to 
assail the last.” (Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre.)8 At best, norms are based on formalisations 
of practical wisdom derived from experience, and treated only as rough guides to 
concrete practices. This is why Aristotle put such emphasis on the importance of 
practical experience in developing virtues. Of course, the experience could be such that 
those involved in it are likely to develop vices. In distinguishing virtues from vices we 
have to engage with considerations of well-being, where, as with any kind of knowledge, 
we will find some things we are sure of, some we are tentative about, and some 
unknown, not least because flourishing has to be discovered and made, and there may 
be some kinds we have yet to find. We should pay less attention to the things of logic and 
more to the logic of things. Although procedural justice has its virtues, placing our faith 
in reason in the horizontal dimension is not a substitute for reason in the vertical 
dimension. 
Another way of putting this difference is that the CR/naturalist approaches emphasize 
the ‘aboutness’ of discourse, values and reason. This does not entail an assumption of a 
privileged relation to the world which provides ultimate, absolute truths, just an 
assumption that though fallible, certain understandings of our selves, actions and world, 
                                                          
7. Norms differ from (individual) values in that their distinctive feature is that they are prescribed by 
others.  Values can become formalised as norms, and conversely, norms can influence values. 




can be practically adequate, suggesting that they provide a good-enough fit between 
practice and contexts to allow successful action and flourishing in most cases.  
The alienation of values from the object of valuation and/or from the subject makes 
them appear arbitrary, and when put in the form of prescriptions, as groundless 
injunctions. The reduction of concrete, thick ethical terms like ‘kind’ or ‘cruel’ to thin 
ethical terms like good and bad, right and wrong makes them appear as beyond reason. 
Reason – divorced from its object and from the subject, is reduced to formal rationality, 
logical consistency. These two reductionisms, paralleling the fact-value dichotomy, have 
done immense damage to social science, undermining the critical stance that was so 
evident in the work of its founders. 
The fact that many have mistaken ideas about human nature (for example, that we are 
purely self-interested) does not mean that the whole subject is best avoided or that 
there is nothing to know, for again, mistaken ideas about something presuppose that 
there is something about which they can be mistaken (see also Midgley, 1984). And of 
course many philosophers had mistaken ideas about human nature (Kant on the 
capacities of Africans, for example). In addition, the failure to acknowledge our 
vulnerability and dependence in masculine modernist culture, led to a form of splitting 
in which these characteristics were seen negatively and projected onto the colonised 
others. But as Anthony Appiah argues, the problem here was not naturalism or 
universalism, but mistaken naturalism and a failure to be sufficiently universalistic 
(Appiah, 2005, p. 250) - or in CR terms, a failure to be attentive to the other.  
Post-structuralists may be concerned that CR, particularly with the naturalistic 
emphasis sketched here, is essentialist. Although the word essentialist is used in a wide 
range of ways - and often as a simple pejorative in no need of explanation of what the 
‘sin’ consists in – it generally reflects concerns first that phenomena, particularly people, 
are being treated as homogeneous, thereby denying difference. Second, it typically 
involves a suspicion of determinism: any object has particular properties so it inevitably 
behaves in a fixed way. CR (and other naturalist philosophies) certainly does claim that 
we and other species and things have particular capacities - causal powers and 
susceptibilities, some of them fairly distinctive. But first, CR doesn’t have to assume 
homogeneity, in fact it can accept that difference goes all the way down, that everything 
varies, albeit to varying extent, and the adequacy of any ontology of discrete distinct 
objects needs to be checked rather assumed.  So none of the properties that human 
beings have, whether similar or dissimilar to those of other species, exist in exactly the 
same form and degree in all individuals, for reasons to do with both biology and cultural 
difference and their interaction in shaping our mind-bodies. From a CR point of view, 
given the importance in ethics of attentiveness to particular persons, practices and 
situations, acknowledging variation and difference is vital for ethical behaviour.  
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Further, regarding the charge of determinism, most of these capacities or causal powers 
and susceptibilities may or may not be activated. Most people are physically capable of 
violence against others, but few may activate that causal power. Again, it is contingent 
whether such powers are activated, and even when they are, the consequences depend 
on the context and whatever other causal powers and susceptibilities are met. Further, 
many of our capacities only come into being in certain contingent circumstances, 
through particular interactions of physiological and cognitive social processes that 
depend particularly on our education and broader socialization – for example, whether 
we are brought up in a literate or non-literate society. So there is nothing deterministic 
about this kind of naturalism and it doesn’t reduce to biologism.  
 
A Qualified Ethical Naturalism 
What I am proposing, then, is a kind of naturalism that is qualified in ways that allow it 
to escape the usual pitfalls of ignoring cultural variety and foreclosing possibilities of 
novelty. By ‘nature’ here I do not mean just biology but the total assemblage of processes 
that constitute us - cultural, social, cognitive, biological, material. These are the key 
qualifications: 
1. Human nature/being is a constrained and enabled, but open-ended process of 
becoming, resulting from the contingent interaction and co-development of 
cognitive, social and biological capacities and processes. Ethics should take 
account of the differently cultivated natures of people throughout the life course 
and their capacities for suffering and flourishing in all their variety. Thus what is 
ethical for an able-bodied person may not for someone with a disability.  
2. In the range of human cultures there are many different conceptions of needs, and 
well-being or ‘the good’. While there is some variety in what is construed as good, 
not just anything that is claimed to be good is good, hence the need to 
acknowledge the possibility of misconceptions. Or to put it another way, because 
we are not completely malleable or indifferent to how we are treated, what is 
construed as good may not be capable of being successfully constructed to be 
good. Not all kinds of suffering and limitation can be passed off as good, and 
hence resistance to dominant misconceptions is to be expected. 
3. Sometimes different cultural forms are forms of the same thing: cultures may 
have different ways of showing respect for others, but the importance they attach 
to observing them shows something in common – the importance of respect. In 
addition, different cultural forms allow objectively different kinds of flourishing, 
and suffering: a mainly Dionysian culture allows different kinds from a mainly 
Appollonian culture.  
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4. Some forms of practice have a high degree of cultural autonomy and are not 
biologically necessary, though they may have effects that are physiologically and 
psychologically beneficial and count among criteria for their evaluation. Insofar 
as members of particular cultures form commitments to those practices, for 
example those of a religion, so they form part of their identity, then denial of the 
possibility of practising them is an objective harm. 
This is therefore an objectivist and pluralist view of well-being, but not a relativist one. 
There are many possible forms of flourishing, some of which we have possibly not yet 
discovered, but not just anything can be passed off as flourishing. This qualified ethical 
naturalism is compatible with the Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (Sen, 1999; 
Nussbaum, 2000).  
 
Habermas’ discourse ethics 
Having presented this brief summary of critical realist and related naturalist approaches 
to critical theory, let me briefly make explicit what I find problematic about Habermas’ 
work on critique and discourse ethics. 
In this, he attempts to ground critical standpoints not in some conception of human 
well-being but in the very preconditions of discourse itself. While I accept his arguments 
as sound on their own terms, and while the valorization of deliberative democracy is 
certainly attractive, the exercise remains, as many commentators have noted, a formal, 
contentless one; the good is whatever might be defined as good in unconstrained 
deliberative discourse amongst equals. Like its Kantian antecedent, it is basically a 
procedural approach to ethics. It abstracts from and leaves open the actual content of 
any ethical discourse, and removes it from the context of flourishing and suffering, from 
emotional reason, material practice and phronesis.9 Again, but for the fact that we are 
social animals and can suffer or flourish it is not clear why we would be motivated to 
deliberate with others. Any example of such discourse would have to appeal to evidence, 
standards, and norms, and these in turn would presumably have to adduce some 
implications for well-being, including that of valued cultural practices. Even where the 
internal standards of practices were appealed to as criteria - ‘the good of the 
church/sport/discipline’ or whatever – the practices themselves would have to be 
justified, and for this they must ultimately have to make claims about flourishing. Yet 
                                                          
9. Habermas claims to correct the Kantian model of the unsituated subject by acknowledging that our 
capacity for agency develops through socialisation into forms of life structured by communicative 
interaction, but even this involves a form of linguistic reductionism, and a scholastic fallacy; it ignores the 




Habermas is extraordinarily coy about what discourse might be about, as if vertical 
relations of reference or ‘aboutness’ do not also have a role (Collier, 2003). Ironically, 
given his critique of Foucault, his own work could therefore be accused of being crypto-
normative.  
Thus while discourse ethics serves as an interesting second-order reflection on critique 
it remains a way of evading the most important issue: what is good or right and why?10 
Small wonder then, that discourse ethics has had so little influence on concrete studies 
in critical social science. Desirable though deliberative democracy is – not least 
intrinsically because it enables us to act rationally, justly and with respect for others – it 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for promoting flourishing. The distance of discourse 
ethics from ordinary life, so evident in its own discourse and style, with its apparent 




What is the essence of critique? Here are some possible candidates: 
First: the reduction of illusion in society through the identification of false beliefs that 
inform practice, such as those of racism. One variant of this is sometimes termed ‘de-
naturalizing’, i.e. identifying the contingency or historical and cultural specificity of 
social phenomena: the world has been and could be different. While this is indeed 
essential for critical social theory, and widely assumed to have radical implications, it 
doesn’t actually take us very far. A fascist could agree that another world is possible; a 
conservative could agree but argue that we already live in the best of possible worlds.  
Second, and related to this, critique is sometimes defined as of the exposure and critique 
of contradictions and irrationalities, such as those underpinning capitalism’s crisis-
prone nature. But why these should actually a problem for people still needs to be 
explained. 
Third, it may involve critique of ideology in the Marxist sense – that is not only 
identifying false beliefs supporting domination, but explaining why they are held, and 
how they have a self-confirming character by helping to maintain circumstances (‘real 
appearances’) that support those beliefs. As Bourdieu said, a critique should be able to 
                                                          
10. For Aristotelians a strong distinction between the right and the good has little meaning. 
11. For critiques of Habermas see Dews (1999), especially the essays by Maeve Cooke and Dieter Henrich, 




“explain the apparent truth of the theory that it shows to be false” (Bourdieu, 2005). This 
second explanatory stage is vital, but the reasons why the false beliefs are a problem is 
left unclear. 
Important though all these characteristics are, they don’t go far enough, because they 
leave out the critique of injustice, avoidable suffering, and restricted flourishing. 
In actual critical social science, if not in its rationales, this eudaimonistic element  is 
implicit in common terms like ‘exploitation’, ‘oppression’, ‘racism’, ‘abuse’, ‘othering – 
inherently evaluative terms. However, critical social scientists rarely go beyond these 
terms and defend the evaluations that lie behind them. Possibly they may assume that 
their readers already accept their valuations, or assume them to be too obvious to need 
defending. But they might also be aware that if they do pursue such questions, they are 
likely to be accused of importing their values into the analysis, as if these could only be a 
contaminant, distorting otherwise objective analysis. Alternatively they may be asked 
‘where their critique hails from’, which again implies that the evaluation is problematic 
because it is ‘subjective’ and arbitrary, or deriving from an imagined Archimedean point 
(which it needn’t), or imposing some kind of repressive universalism. Tactically, then, 
radicals may find it best not to reveal too much of their critical standpoints, for the more 
they do so, the more likely they are to be dismissed as ‘subjective’ or as authoritarians 
foisting their views on others. As a result, much of critical social science just gives the 
reader a vague negative feeling about the phenomena being analysed, but does not 
attempt to say in what particular respects and for what reasons they are problematic. It 
might therefore be termed crypto-normative.  
I would argue that we need to analyse just what is problematic about the targets of such 
critiques of ill-being. In so doing, engagement with empirical evidence and a qualified 
naturalism are indispensable. Sometimes, moral and political philosophy can provide 
such an analysis, but the unfortunate divorce of philosophy from substantive social 
science in the 19th century meant that not only the dialogue between them but the 
content of the separated disciplines suffered. Critical social science and critical theory 
need to get back together again.  
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